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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 
The remarkable success of international arbitration has caused anxiety in the common law world. 
By taking cases away from courts, international arbitration causes a dearth of precedent in 
certain areas of the law and is perceived as a threat to the healthy development of the law. This 
article suggests that the cause could also be the cure: legal techniques used by international 
arbitration practitioners, who routinely have to cope with a dearth of case law, might be what 
common law practitioners need when deprived of precedents. 
The argument unfolds as follows. Part II explains the effect of international arbitration on case 
law. The success of international arbitration as a means of settling international commercial 
disputes means that many disputes are transferred from courts to arbitration tribunals. 
Additionally, the traditional confidentiality of international arbitration means that most arbitral 
awards are not published. These two phenomena result in a severe dearth of precedent in certain 
areas of the law where international arbitration is popular. We focus on three examples: the 
construction industry; the excess insurance (and reinsurance) industry; and the oil and gas 
industry. 
Part III contrasts common and civil law reactions to this phenomenon and seeks to explain the 
contrast. For common law jurists, the very success of arbitration is a threat to the healthy 
development of the law. Its confidentiality adds insult to injury. By contrast, civil law jurists are 
not concerned by the success of international arbitration; at most, they believe it would be useful 
to reduce confidentiality. Different traditional concepts of law in these two legal traditions 
explain the contrast between common law anxiety and civil law serenity. 
Part IV discusses how, in our experience, international arbitration practitioners deal with a dearth 
of precedent. This is a difficulty that they often face, and they have adopted certain legal 
techniques to address it. We examine four in particular: reference to academic treatises and 
other scholarly writings; a comparative approach; reliance on industry practice; and reasoning 
from abstract principles. 
Part V then raises the question whether precedent-deprived common law practitioners might 
address the dearth of precedent by using similar techniques as international arbitration 
practitioners employ. The question might seem incongruous. To show that it is not, we use the 
example of U.S. courts facing issues of first impression—by definition issues on which no 
precedent is available. We show that, at the margin, U.S. advocates and judges resort to similar 
techniques. 
We conclude that experience in international arbitration would  indicate that, in precedent- 
deprived areas, common lawyers may be forced to amend their approach and the margin may 
need to become the center. International arbitration is a cause of anxiety for common lawyers; it 
may also offer the cure. 
 
II. THE EFFECT OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION ON CASE LAW 
 
International arbitration is the dispute resolution method of choice in international trade. The 
success of international arbitration as a means of settling international commercial disputes 
means that many disputes that in the absence of international arbitration would be decided by 
domestic judges are instead decided by international arbitrators.  In other words, international 
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arbitration has the effect of diminishing the amount of court precedents in the fields in which 
arbitration is a popular method of dispute settlement. Additionally, the typical confidentiality of 
international arbitration means that most arbitral awards are not published. These two 
phenomena, taken together, result in a severe dearth of precedents, whether court precedents or 
arbitral precedents, in certain areas of the law where arbitration is a popular method of dispute 
settlement. 
A.   Arbitration  is  the  Method  of  Choice  for  the  Settlement  of  Disputes  in 
International Commerce 
 
“International arbitration is now known to be ‘the’ ordinary and normal method of settling 
disputes of international trade.”2 This observation, made in 1987 by the late Pierre Lalive, one of 
the pioneers of international arbitration, rings even more true today. In particular, international 
arbitration has become the method of choice for dispute resolution in certain industries when 
operating on the international plane, such as major construction projects, excess insurance (and 
reinsurance), and the oil and gas industry.3 Because arbitration proceedings are often 
confidential,4 it is difficult to cite numbers to support these assertions. Klaus Peter Berger, a 
German international arbitration scholar, has stated that 90% of international economic contracts 
have an arbitration clause.5 This may be an exaggeration.6 But any suggestion that a “flight 
from arbitration” is occurring7 is incorrect when it comes to international commerce. Data from 
the major international arbitration institutions demonstrates a steady growth in the number of 
disputes they administer.8 
 
 
2 Pierre  Lalive,  Transnational   (or  Truly   International)  Public   Policy  and  International  Arbitration,  in 
COMPARATIVE ARBITRATION PRACTICE AND PUBLIC POLICY IN ARBITRATION 257, 293 (Pieter Sanders ed., 1987) 
(emphasis in the original). 
 
3  See infra Part II.C. 
 
4  See infra Part II.B. 
 
5 Klaus Peter Berger, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ARBITRATION 8 n.62 (1993) (“About ninety  percent of 
international economic contracts contain an arbitration clause.”). 
 
6 See, e.g., GARY BORN, INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 97 (2d ed. 2014) (“This figure lacks empirical 
support and is almost certainly inflated: in reality, significant numbers of international commercial transactions – 
certainly much more than 10% of all contracts – contain either forum selection clauses or no dispute resolution 
provision at all.”). 
 
7 Compare Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight from Arbitration: An Empirical Study of Ex Ante 
Arbitration Clauses in the Contracts of Publicly Held Companies, 56 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 336 (2007) (suggesting 
that “sophisticated actors prefer litigation to arbitration”), and Theodore Eisenberg, Geoffrey P. Miller & Emily 
Sherwin, Arbitration Summer Soldiers: An Empirical Study of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer 
Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 871, 893 (2008) (concluding that “consumer arbitration clauses are used as a 
means for avoiding aggregate dispute resolution”), with Christopher R. Drahozal & Stephen J. Ware, Why Do 
Businesses Use (and Not Use) Arbitration Clauses?, 25 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 433, 435-36 (2010) (refuting 
the conclusions of the above-quoted studies). 
 
8 See TOWARDS A SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION: COLLECTED EMPIRICAL RESEARCH  app. 1, at 341 
(Christopher R. Drahozal & Richard W. Naimark eds., 2005); see also BORN, supra note 6, at 94. 
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Several features of international arbitration explain its success in the settlement of disputes in 
international commerce. Among the most often cited are neutrality, enforceability, flexibility, 
and confidentiality. Indeed, in the international context, the actual and apparent neutrality of an 
arbitral tribunal makes it, as compared to the domestic courts of each of the parties, “the only 
game” or a “de facto monopoly.”9 The New York Convention10 makes recognition and 
enforcement of international arbitration awards easier than the recognition and enforcement of 
foreign judgments.11 The flexibility of arbitration enables the parties to tailor the proceedings to 
their specific needs.12 Finally, parties often value the confidentiality of international arbitration 
proceedings.13 
B. The Confidentiality of International Arbitration 
Confidentiality is traditionally viewed as a hallmark of international arbitration.14 It imposes an 
obligation on the parties (and the arbitral tribunal and the arbitration institution) not to disclose 
information concerning, or acquired in the course of, the arbitral proceedings. This traditional 
regime of strong confidentiality is backed by default rules. In the absence of specific party 
agreement on confidentiality, several national arbitration laws and arbitration rules provide for 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
9 Jan Paulsson, International Arbitration Is Not Arbitration, STOCKHOLM INT’L ARB. REV., 2008, at 1, 2 (neither 
party wants the home courts of the other party to decide on the dispute). 
 
10 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 4739. 
 
11 ALAN REDFERN ET AL., REDFERN AND HUNTER ON INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION § 1.93, at 33 (5th ed. 2009) (“In 
its international enforceability, an award also differs from the judgment of a court of law, since the international 
treaties that govern the enforcement of an arbitral award (such as the New York Convention) have much greater 
acceptance internationally than treaties for the reciprocal enforcement of judgments”); see John B. Bellinger, III & 
R.  Reeves Anderson, Tort Tourism: The Case for a Federal Law on Foreign Judgment Recognition, 54 VIRG. J. 
INT’L L. 501 (2014) (describing the maze of statutory and common law rules governing the recognition of foreign 
judgments in the United States and proposing a federal rule to promote uniformity and consistency). Attempts at 
enacting a global convention on the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments have failed. See generally A 
GLOBAL LAW OF JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS: LESSONS FROM THE HAGUE (John J. Barceló III & Kevin M. 
Clermont eds., 2002); Bellinger & Anderson, supra at 529 (stating that “despite decades of negotiations, U.S. 
officials have been unable to conclude a multilateral judgments agreement comparable to the New York 
Convention” and summarizing these decades of failed negotiations). 
 
12 REDFERN, supra note 11, § 1.95, at 33. 
 
13 Id. § 1.96, at 33-34. 
 
14 PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds. 2008); REDFERN, supra 
note 11, § 2.145, at 136 (“The confidentiality of arbitral proceedings has traditionally been taken to be one of the 
important advantages of arbitration.”); Karl-Heinz Böckstiegel, Introductory Remarks, in PRECEDENT IN 
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 17, 17 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas Banifatemi eds. 2008) (discussing “[t]he 
traditional confidentiality of arbitration”). 
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the confidentiality of the arbitral proceedings and the arbitral award.15 Of most important 
practical importance, none of the major arbitral institutions publishes copies of the arbitral 
awards rendered under its auspices.16 
The current trend in international arbitration is to “diminish, or at least question, the 
confidentiality of arbitral proceedings as a whole.”17 This is particularly acute in the field of 
international investment arbitration,18 but the same trend can be noted in relation to international 
commercial arbitration. The ICC, for instance, deliberately decided not to include default 
confidentiality obligations in its latest arbitration rules.19 Again, this push against confidentiality 
and for more transparency operates at the level of default rules: in the absence of specific party 
agreement on confidentiality, it is now typically suggested that no confidentiality obligation 
should be implied. 
 
 
15 The New Zealand arbitration statute provides for the confidentiality of arbitration. Arbitration Act 1996 §14B(1) 
(N.Z.) (“Every arbitration agreement to which this section applies is deemed to provide that the parties and the 
arbitral tribunal  must  not  disclose confidential  information.”). English courts have found a general principle of 
confidentiality in English law. See REDFERN, supra note 11, §§ 2.149-50, at 137 (citing to Ali Shipping Corp. v. ‘Shipyard 
Trogir,’ [1998] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 643; Hassneh Insurance Co. of Israel v. Mew, [1993] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 243; Dolling-Baker v. 
Merrett, [1991] 2 All. E.R. 890). This principle is subject to limited exceptions. See Born, supra note 6, at 2794 n.61 (citing to 
Emmott v. Michael Wilson & Partners Ltd [2008] EWCA Civ 184 (English Ct. App.); Milsom v. Mukhtar [2011] EWHC 955 
(Ch) (English High Ct.)).. The UNCITRAL Model Law is silent on the question of confidentiality, as the drafters 
considered that it was better to leave the issue to arbitration rules. See Pieter Sanders, UNCITRAL’s Model Law on 
International and  Commercial Arbitration: Present Situation and  Future, 21  ARB. INT’L 443  (2005). Some 
arbitration rules provide for the confidentiality of the award. See, e.g., UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, art. 34(5) 
(2010); LCIA Arbitration Rules, art. 30 (2014); CPR Rules for Administered Arbitration of International Disputes, r. 
20 (2014). 
 
16 The International Court of Arbitration of the International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”) at times publishes 
redacted portions of arbitral awards rendered under its auspices. But neither the ICC nor any other of the major 
arbitral institutions administering international commercial and investment arbitration (the International Centre for 
Settlement of Investment Disputes (“ICSID”), the Permanent Court of Arbitration (“PCA”), the London Court of 
International Arbitration (“LCIA”), the International Center for Dispute Resolution (“ICDR”), the Arbitration 
Institute of the Stockholm Chamber of Commerce (“SCC”), the Singapore International Arbitration Center 
(“SIAC”), the Hong Kong International Arbitration Center (“HKIAC”)) systematically publishes arbitral awards 
rendered under its auspices. 
 
17 REDFERN, supra note 11, § 2.152, at 138; see BORN, supra note 6, at 2779-80 (“The confidentiality and privacy of 
international arbitration proceedings is a contentious and unsettled subject.”). 
 
18 See UNCITRAL Rules on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration (2014); United Nations 
Convention on Transparency in Treaty-based Investor-State Arbitration, Dec. 10, 2014, (the “Mauritius Convention 
on Transparency”). 
 
19 See ICC Rules of Arbitration, r. 22(3) (2012); Jason Fry et al., The Secretariat’s Guide to ICC Arbitration, ¶ 3-807 
at 235 (2012) (“The Rules do not provide that the arbitration proceedings are confidential. Rather than creating a 
general rule requiring the proceedings to be kept confidential and then attempting to define the exceptions that will 
inevitably arise, the Rules take a more flexible and tailor-made approach, leaving the matter for the parties or the 
arbitral tribunal to address in light of the specific circumstances of the case”). In addition, in recent years, several 
national courts have found that the country’s arbitration law does not include an express or implied duty of 
confidentiality. See, e.g., Esso Australia Res. Ltd v. Plowman, XXI Y.B. Comm. Arb. 137, 151 (Australian High Ct. 
1995) (1996); Judgment of 27 October 2000, Bulgarian Foreign Trade Bank Ltd v. A.I. Trade Fin. Inc., XXVI Y.B. 
Comm. Arb. 291, 298 (Swedish S.Ct.) (2001). 
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The fact remains, however, that, parties often agree that the arbitral proceedings and the arbitral 
award are to be confidential, and many arbitration rules continue to contain a confidentiality 
requirement.20 The current move away from confidentiality in international arbitration, 
therefore, does not fundamentally alter our general assessment of the arbitral landscape in terms 
of confidentiality. Most arbitration proceedings and awards are confidential. Even the ICC, for 
instance, continues to publish only certain awards and then only in redacted form; and the same 
remains through for most if not all other arbitral institutions. Proceedings and awards that 
emerge, through official publication or leaks, are only the tip of the arbitral iceberg.  Even when 
awards do get published, they are not always easy to search or find.21 
C.   Dearth of Precedent in Areas of Law Where International Arbitration is the 
Dispute Resolution Method of Choice 
 
The success and confidentiality of international arbitration, taken together, mean that in certain 
areas of the law, there is a severe dearth of precedent—be it judicial or arbitral.  We focus below 
on three industries where the dearth of relevant precedent is particularly striking – construction, 
excess insurance, and oil and gas. 
 
1.   Construction 
 
The FIDIC22 contracts are the most widely used standard forms of international construction 
contract. Since the first FIDIC form was published in 1957, FIDIC contracts have provided for 
the final settlement of disputes under the Rules of Arbitration of the ICC.23 As a result, there are 
few court precedents directly interpreting the FIDIC contracts.24 What is true in particular of the 
FIDIC contracts is true, though to a lesser degree, of construction disputes in general. To quote 
the former Chief Justice of Canada: 
The trend is clear. Fewer and fewer construction cases are reaching 
the courts where the law is developed. Increasingly, instead of 
being resolved by judges, construction disputes are being sent to 
 
 
 
 
20 See supra note 16. 
 
21 See generally S.I. Strong, Research in International Commercial Arbitration: Special Skills, Special Sources, 20 
AM. REV. OF INT’L ARB. 119 (2009). 
 
22 “FIDIC” is the acronym for “Fédération Internationale des Ingénieurs Conseils,” or International Federation of 
Consulting Engineers. See About FIDIC, INTERNATIONAL FEDERATION OF CONSULTING ENGINEERS, 
http://fidic.org/about-fidic (last visited on June 15, 2015). 
 
23  Christopher R. Seppälä, The Development of a Case Law in Construction Disputes Relating to FIDIC Contracts, 
in PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 67, 67 (Yas Banifatemi ed., 2008). 
 
24 Note that “English court decisions dealing with issues relevant to FIDIC contracts have been published, notably, 
in Building Law Reports in England,” and that “the main published commentaries, in book form, on the FIDIC 
contracts, are by British lawyers and engineers, and that they refer primarily to English case law precedent.” Id. at 
71 n.2. 
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mediation, arbitration, or other forms of alternate dispute 
resolution (ADR).25 
Construction contracts are complex, long-term contracts which give rise to many disputes. There 
must have been hundreds, if not thousands, of arbitrations under the FIDIC contracts. It would 
therefore not be unreasonable to assume that “if ever there was an area where an arbitration case 
law should have developed, it would be in relation to the FIDIC contracts.”26 Such an 
assumption, however, would be erroneous. In 2008, our colleague Christopher Seppälä, who for 
many years acted as the legal advisor to FIDIC, set out to collect arbitration awards rendered in 
arbitrations under a FIDIC contract. After reviewing all major international arbitration sources 
as well as other sources,27 he identified only about 40 arbitral awards interpreting the FIDIC 
contracts.28   Forty awards over a period of over fifty years of use of these contracts is not a lot, 
and any practitioner with experience would agree that it is only a small sample of the awards that 
must have been rendered during that time period.29 
 
2. Excess insurance (and Reinsurance) 
 
Another striking domain for its dearth of precedent is excess insurance, and in particular excess 
insurance disputes under the so-called “Bermuda Form.” The Bermuda Form is an excess 
liability insurance form that was introduced to the commercial insurance market in 1985, 
following the crisis of the excess liability insurance market in the United States in the mid-1980s, 
and that has since “grown to be a mainstay policy option for large commercial policyholders, 
 
 
 
 
25 Beverley McLachlin PC, Judging the “Vanishing Trial” in the Construction Industry, 2 FAULKNER L. REV. 315 
(2011). 
 
26 Seppälä, supra note 23, at 68. 
 
27 Chris describes that he reviewed the collections of ICC awards (1974-2000), the ICCA Yearbook of Commercial 
Arbitration (1976-2007), the ICC Bulletin, and the International Construction Law Review (1983-2007), as well as 
the ASA Bulletin, Mealey’s and several other sources. Seppälä, supra note 23, at 69. 
 
28 Id. Chris commented on some of these awards at Christopher R. Seppälä, International Construction Contract 
Disputes: Commentary on ICC Awards Dealing with the FIDIC International Conditions of Contracts, 9/2 ICC 
BULLETIN 32 (1998) (commenting on Extracts from ICC Awards, Construction Contracts Referring to the FIDIC 
Conditions—Part I, 9/1 ICC BULLETIN 74 (1998) and Extracts from ICC Awards, Construction Contracts Referring 
to the FIDIC Conditions—Part II, 9/2 ICC BULLETIN 46 (1998)). 
 
29 Subsequently, at Chris’ behest, some more FIDIC awards have been published in the ICC Bulletin. See 
Christopher R. Seppälä, International Construction Contract Disputes: Second  Commentary on ICC  Awards 
Dealing Primarily with FIDIC Contracts, 19/2 ICC BULLETIN 41 (2008) (commentary on 2008 extracts); Extracts 
from ICC Arbitral Awards in International Construction Disputes, 19/2 ICC BULLETIN 71 (2008); Christopher R. 
Seppälä, International Construction Contract Disputes: Third Commentary on ICC Awards Dealing Primarily with 
FIDIC Contracts, 23/2 ICC BULLETIN 23 (2012) (commentary on 2012 extracts); Extracts from ICC Arbitral 
Awards in International Construction Disputes, 23/2 ICC BULLETIN 45 (2012); Christopher R. Seppälä, 
International Construction Contract Disputes: Fourth Commentary on ICC Awards Dealing Primarily with FIDIC 
Contracts, 24/2 ICC BULLETIN 49 (2013) (commentary on 2013 extracts); Extracts from ICC Arbitral Awards in 
International Construction Disputes, 24/2 ICC BULLETIN 59 (2013). 
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especially those with significant North American liability exposures.”30 Bermuda Form policies 
are typically governed by New York law and provide for the final settlement of disputes by ad 
hoc arbitration in London under the English Arbitration Act.31 As a result, the Bermuda Form is 
“the subject of almost no significant reported decisions.”32 
Given that New York law governs the Bermuda Form, many of the Bermuda Form’s clauses may 
be interpreted on the basis of relevant New York precedent. Certain clauses, however, have no 
equivalent in the insurance contracts typically interpreted by New York courts (one example is 
the notion of “integrated occurrence”33). In these cases, there are no precedents directly on point, 
even though hundreds of disputes have been arbitrated on the basis of policies written on the 
Bermuda Form. 
In a similar vein, many significant reinsurance disputes are settled by arbitration and  the 
resulting arbitral awards are almost never published. In the words of leading authors on English 
reinsurance law: 
One frustration . . . is the fact that some of the most illuminating 
recent decisions in this field must remain confidential. . . . Some of 
the finest judges and lawyers in the reinsurance field have 
produced detailed arbitration awards in difficult areas of 
reinsurance litigation, but the learning must remain hidden. . . . As 
a result the majority of contested decisions are not available to the 
researcher and the reinsurance wheel has to be reinvented time and 
again.34 
 
3. Oil and Gas 
 
According to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (“Second Circuit”), 
“there is a dearth of authority in New York relating to oil and gas leases.”35   Commentators go 
 
 
 
30 DAVID SCOREY, RICHARD GEDDES & CHRIS HARRIS, THE BERMUDA FORM— INTERPRETATION AND DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION OF EXCESS LIABILITY ix (Oxford University Press, 2011). 
 
31 See John Fellas, International Arbitration under the Bermuda Form, 8 DISP. RESOL. INT’L 129, 129 (2014). 
 
32 RICHARD JACOBS QC, LORELIE S. MASTERS & PAUL STANLEY, LIABILITY INSURANCE IN INTERNATIONAL 
ARBITRATION—THE BERMUDA FORM vii (2d ed. 2011) (calling this fact “an embarrassment to  commercial 
certainty” and adding that “[a] few reported cases exist, now, largely touching on tangential issues (such as the law 
governing the arbitration clause)”). 
 
33 SCOREY, GEDDES & HARRIS, supra note 30, at ¶ 8.25 at 146 (Oxford University Press, 2011) (“The overall point 
to be taken is that New York law interpreting the scope of injuries and damages that may be swept within a single 
occurrence has been driven by occurrence definitions that are significantly different, and more limited in scope, than 
those appearing in the Bermuda Form”). 
 
34 COLIN EDELMAN QC & ANDREW BURNS, THE LAW OF REINSURANCE x–xi (Oxford University Press, 2d ed. 2013). 
 
35 Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, LLC, 761 F.3d 221, 228 (2d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing 
Wiser v. Enervest Operating, L.L.C., 803 F. Supp. 2d 109, 117 (N.D.N.Y. 2011)). 
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further: “New York presents essentially a blank slate as to all significant oil and gas lease 
issues.”36 The lack of court precedent in the field of oil and gas leases is so stark that the Second 
Circuit recently took the highly unusual37 step of certifying questions of contract interpretation in 
the context of oil and gas leases to the New York Court of Appeals (the highest state court).38 
We have noted the dearth of New York law precedent in relation to oil and gas matters in our 
own work. For instance, while so-called “take or pay” clauses are common in gas supply 
contracts, when we handled a dispute regarding such a provision in an international arbitration, 
we could find almost no New York case law on the matter. One explanation might be that New 
York law is not often chosen for international oil and gas contracts; but in on our experience, this 
is not the case. We believe the real reason is that the vast majority of international oil and gas 
contracts contain an arbitration clause. 
Construction, insurance, and oil and gas are three sectors involving numerous disputes, with 
significant financial and legal stakes. This makes the dearth of precedent in these fields all the 
more striking. This dearth of precedent has prompted different reactions among civil law and 
common law jurists.39 
 
III. CONTRASTING  COMMON  LAW  AND  CIVIL  LAW  REACTIONS  TO  THE 
DEARTH OF PRECEDENT 
 
Common law and civil law jurists react very differently to the above-described phenomenon. 
Many common law jurists see in arbitration a threat to the healthy development of the law. The 
very existence of arbitration is a source of anxiety for them, and arbitration’s confidentiality only 
adds insult to injury. For civil law jurists, by contrast, arbitration is not a cause for great 
concern. Some push for more transparency and for the publication of arbitration awards. But 
this is not because they think that the healthy development of the law demands it, but simply 
because, all things being equal, some guidance is better than no guidance. This section describes 
and explains the contrast between this common law anxiety and civil law serenity. 
 
 
 
36 George A. Bibikos & Jeffrey C. King, A Primer on Oil and Gas Law in the Marcellus Shale States, 4 TEX. J. OIL 
GAS ENERGY L. 155, 191 (2008–2009); see also id. at 157 (asking “how does one comply with the law of a state 
when it has very limited oil and gas jurisprudence, and its most recent leading cases are over one hundred years 
old?”). 
 
37 761 F.3d at 228 (acknowledging that the case turned on “questions of contract interpretation that may not be the 
typical material for certification”). 
 
38 See id. at 232 (The court certified two questions. First, “[u]nder New York law, and in the context of an oil and 
gas lease, did the State’s Moratorium [on the use of horizontal drilling and high-volume hydraulic fracturing] 
amount to a force majeure event?” Second, “[i]f so, does the force majeure clause modify the habendum clause and 
extend the primary terms of the leases?”) (emphasis in the original). The New York Court of Appeals answered only 
the second question. See Beardslee v. Inflection Energy, LLC, 31 N.E.3d 80, 85-86 (2015) (answering the second 
question in the negative and declining to answer the first question because it was, consequently, “academic”). 
 
39 “‘Common law’ and ‘civil law’ refer not to specific systems, but are instead used as ideal types.” CATHERINE A. 
ROGERS, ETHICS IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 12 (2014) (citing to MIRJAN R. DAMAŠKA, THE FACES OF JUSTICE 
AND STATE AUTHORITY: A COMPARATIVE APPROACH TO THE LEGAL PROCESS 130 n.60 (1986)).  On the usefulness 
and limitations of these ideal types, see ROGERS, supra. 
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A.   Common Law Anxiety and Civil Law Serenity 
 
1.   Common Law Anxiety 
 
The dearth of precedent caused in certain areas of the law by the success and confidentiality of 
international arbitration has led to a significant amount of commentary by common law 
practitioners. One point in particular comes back with regularity, from all corners of the 
common law world: the dearth of precedent caused by international arbitration is perceived as a 
pathological phenomenon endangering the healthy development of the common law. 
Common law judges have given voice to this anxiety. Thus, for instance, Beverley McLachlin, 
the former Chief Justice of Canada, with specific reference to the construction industry, warns: 
“court decisions, over the years, build up a settled legal framework against which contracts can 
be drawn and disputes settled, whatever the forum.”40 Talking of ADR, she asserts in a striking 
metaphor:  “The living tree of the law finds little nourishment in such arid soil.  The age-old 
fruits of the law – helping people predict the probable outcomes of their actions and to modify 
their behavior intelligently – do not grow.”41 
Common law scholars have also joined the chorus. For instance, Kenneth Abraham, a prominent 
insurance law scholar in the United States, in an article focusing on the use of binding arbitration 
for the resolution of insurance disputes, states: “This lawlessness [of arbitration] not only 
adversely affects the parties to each dispute, but the legal system as a whole.”42 Further, 
“[b]ecause arbitrations are essentially confidential and set no precedents, they lack an important 
feature of the rule of law: each arbitration is an island unto itself, not governed by any prior 
arbitration outcomes and incapable of having an effect on any future arbitration.”43 
This anxious concern for a healthy development of the law is even one of the reasons for a 
famous international arbitration “oddity” – Section 69 of the 1996 English Arbitration Act, 
which provides for the possibility of appeals on questions of English law. Thus, according to a 
distinguished English practitioner, “[i]t remains unthinkable that the symbiotic link should be 
broken between commercial arbitration, the development of the English law and the English 
Commercial Court.”44 The symbiotic and organic link between the law courts and the law is thus 
maintained by the possibility of appealing arbitration awards on questions of English law. 
 
 
 
40 McLachlin, supra note 25, at 321. 
 
41 Id. at 322. 
 
42 Kenneth S. Abraham & J. W. Montgomery, III, The Lawlessness of Arbitration, 9 CONN. INS. L.J. 355, 357 
(2003). 
 
43 Id. at 360. 
 
44 Taner Dedezade, Are You In? Or Are You Out? An Analysis of Section 69 of the English Arbitration Act 1996: 
Appeals on a Question of Law, 2006 INT’L A.L.R. 56, 59 (quoting V.V. Veeder, On  Reforming  the  English 
Arbitration Act of 1996, in COMMERCIAL LAW: PERSPECTIVES AND PRACTICE 243 (John Lowry & Loukas Mistelis 
eds., 2005)). 
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For the common lawyer, the real source of anxiety is not the confidentiality of international 
arbitration, but international arbitration itself. The common law is developed by the courts, and 
international arbitration (and alternative dispute resolution in general) takes cases away from the 
courts. Even if international arbitration awards were published, the problem would remain: 
because arbitral awards, unlike court precedents, cannot be the building blocks of the common 
law edifice, the success of international arbitration, confidential or not, endangers the 
development of the law. Justice McLachlin makes this very clear: 
In the area of construction law, the operative legal principles are 
not set out in any Code. Rather, they have been developed, and 
must continue to develop, through the common law as applied by 
the courts.   It thus emerges that even in a world dominated by 
ADR, the courts are essential. They, and they alone, can discharge 
the task of norm-setting.45 
 
2. Civil Law Serenity 
 
Civil lawyers do not suffer from the same anxiety as their common law colleagues. For them, 
the cause for concern is not international arbitration (or alternative dispute resolution) itself, but 
only its confidentiality. 
Some, like the French practitioner Alexis Mourre, push for the publication of awards. In a piece 
on this topic, Mourre concludes: “the public interest in the development of arbitral case law, in 
the enhancement of the quality of arbitration, and in providing transparency and predictability to 
the business community overrides the principle of confidentiality as far as the publication of 
arbitration awards is concerned.”46 One sees here something analogous to the anxieties of the 
common law scholars, discussed above. But the emphasis is different. The common law critics 
are concerned that “the law” is endangered by arbitration: arbitration kills the tree of the law, 
arbitration is an island and is isolated from the rest of the law.  Mourre’s concern instead is for 
international arbitration itself: he refers to the “enhancement of the quality of arbitration” and 
“the public interest in the development of arbitral case law.” In short, where the common law 
critics see in arbitration a danger for the common law that needs to be addressed or eliminated, 
Mourre sees a missed opportunity for the law of international arbitration. While many common 
law critics come to the conclusion that the problem is arbitration and there should be less of it, 
Mourre suggests that the problem is confidentiality, and argues that there should be less 
confidentiality so that there is even more and better arbitration. 
Other civil law scholars are even less concerned than Mourre. In an article on the legitimacy of 
international arbitration, Professor Pierre Tercier, a Swiss jurist, concludes that international 
arbitration derives legitimacy from “the coherence of published decisions” and “the community 
of arbitrators.”  He notes that the publication of awards “makes them subject to control:  not by 
 
 
 
45 McLachlin, supra note 25, at 321 (emphasis added). 
 
46 Alexis Mourre, Precedent and Confidentiality in International Commercial Arbitration—The Case for the 
Publication of Arbitral Awards, in PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 39, 65 (Emmanuel Galliard & Yas 
Banifatemi eds. 2008). 
84   
hierarchical authorities, but by other professionals and scholars.”47 Worries about the erosion of 
the law do not appear. 
Another example is found in an article by Professor Jean-Michel Jacquet, a respected French 
jurist. His article, tellingly, is entitled: “Do we need an arbitral case law?”48 He believes we do, 
but still strikes a very optimistic note: “The decisions of arbitral tribunals are more and more 
known, and are frequently cited and analysed. There is no doubt as to the usefulness of such a 
body of reported decisions, since this provides greater certainty.”49 
It is of course easier to prove that something exists than to prove that it does not exist. With this 
caveat in mind, it is submitted that one would have great difficulty finding a civil law lawyer, say 
a Belgian or French lawyer, arguing that the growth of international arbitration endangers the 
well-being of the droit des obligations (contract law). Civil lawyers push for the publication of 
international arbitration awards, not for the sake of the healthy development of the law, but as a 
form of guidance for the arbitrators themselves. 
B. The Cause of the Contrast: Different Concepts of Law 
 
The reason for these different reactions lies in different concepts of what law is. The success of 
international arbitration and the resulting dearth of precedent affect traditional concepts of law 
differently, and lawyers from civil law and common law traditions react accordingly. 
For the civil lawyer, the legislature alone makes law, and the judiciary applies it.50 This 
principle in turn requires that legislation be “complete, coherent, and clear;”51 for if it is not, 
judges might have to make law (and not just apply it) when faced with a gap, a contradiction, or 
an ambiguity. The Code, and in particular the “iconic”52 Napoleonic Code Civil, is the 
embodiment of that ideal. Of course, that ideal is unattainable. However complete, coherent, 
and clear, codes need to be interpreted.  This is why “[t]he teacher-scholar is the real protagonist 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
47 See Pierre Tercier, La légitimité de l'arbitrage, 2011 REVUE DE L'ARBITRAGE 653, 667 (authors’ translation). 
 
48 Jean-Michel  Jacquet,  Avons-nous  besoin  d'une  jurisprudence  arbitrale?,  2010  REVUE  DE  L'ARBITRAGE  445 
(authors’  translation). 
 
49 Id. at 445. 
 
50 JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ROGELIO PÉREZ-PERDOMO, THE CIVIL LAW TRADITION—AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
LEGAL SYSTEMS OF EUROPE AND LATIN AMERICA 30 (3d ed. 2007). 
 
51 Id. 
 
52 James  Q.  Whitman,  No  Right  Answer,  in  CRIME,  PROCEDURE   AND   EVIDENCE   IN   A   COMPARATIVE   AND 
INTERNATIONAL CONTEXT: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR MIRJAN DAMASKA 371, 376 (John Jackson, Maximo 
Langer & Peter Tillers eds., 2008). 
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of the civil law tradition” and “[t]he civil law is a law of the professors.”53 Civil law scholars 
elaborate on the Code and build conceptual cathedrals to approximate the civil law ideal of 
completeness, coherence, and clearness. This is what the comparative law scholar Mirjan 
Damaška has called “the Continental grammar of law.”54    This scholarly legal architecture is 
generally accepted by the legal profession and has a profound influence on the development of 
the law.55 Legal reasoning is essentially deductive, descending from the Code provisions, 
through abstract and refined conceptual distinctions, to the facts. Judges, at least in theory, only 
apply the law to the facts of the case.56   “The net image is of judges as operators of a machine 
designed and built by legislators.”57 The judge is the anonymous applier of the law. “[W]ho 
knows the name of a civil law judge?”58 A corollary to this theory of judging is that court 
decisions are not law, but simply application of law to facts. There is no (formal) doctrine of 
precedent in civil law.59 In fact, in many civil law countries, court decisions are not published or 
they are quite difficult to find. 
For the common lawyer, by contrast, law is essentially judge-made case law.60 The law grows 
organically,61 by the accretion of decided cases, bound together by the doctrine of stare decisis.62 
 
 
53 MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 50, at 56. A funny story of Justice Scalia illustrates both the civil 
law’s admiration for legal scholars and the common law’s reverence for judges. Before he was appointed to the 
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, Justice Scalia was a professor of constitutional 
law at the University of Chicago. While his nomination was pending, one of his daughters was visiting relatives of 
her German professor in Germany. She told them that her father was a professor and added that he soon would be a 
judge. “Their faces dropped.” See Antonin Scalia, The Role of the Judiciary, C-SPAN (Nov. 22, 2008), 
http://www.c-span.org/video/?282547-1/role-judiciary&start=3012. 
 
54 Mirjan Damaška, A Continental Lawyer in an American Law School: Trials and Tribulations of Adjustment, 116 
U. PA. L. REV. 1363, 1365 (1968). 
 
55 Id. 
 
56 See generally Mitchel Lasser, Judicial (Self)-Portraits: Judicial Discourse in the French Legal System, 104 YALE 
L.J. 1325 (1995). 
 
57 MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 50, at 36. 
 
58 Id. 
 
59 That said, decisions of the highest court in the country, as well as certain appeals courts, tend to have significant 
persuasive weight and may in practice have “precedential” force. André Tunc, Methodology of the Civil Law in 
France, 50 TUL. L. REV. 459, 465 (1976) (“Generally, it is only at the level of the courts of first instance and courts 
of appeal that conflicting decisions may be found. Once the Court of Cassation has spoken, it normally will be 
obeyed.”). 
 
60 MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 50, at 34 (“to us the common law means the law created and molded 
by the judges, and we still think (often quite inaccurately) of legislation as serving  a  kind  of  supplementary 
function”). 
 
61 McLachlin, supra note 25, at 315 (“But all areas of law, including construction law, are living, constantly 
evolving, trees. Some branches sprout and grow; others crack and need trimming. Thus, the law develops and 
remains responsive to changes in society.”). 
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The judge is the central figure of the common law.63 In contrast with the anonymous civil law 
judge, common law judges are “culture heroes, even parental figures.”64 Legal reasoning is 
essentially pragmatic and inductive, ascending from facts to principles.65 One  illustrious 
sentence summarizes the essentially pragmatic and concrete nature of the common law: “The 
life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience.”66 
Civil lawyers find this aphorism perplexing. The reaction of André Tunc, a French scholar, is 
representative: 
 
If there is a sentence which a French lawyer has great difficulty in 
understanding, it is Holmes’ famous saying: “The life of the law 
has not been logic: it has been experience.” It is questionable 
whether the opposition between logic and experience has any 
justification. Exact sciences are equally based on experience and 
on logic.  To deny that the world is governed by rules making a 
coherent whole would amount to asserting that it is chaotic, an 
unduly sinister view.67 
Tunc’s reaction illustrates another crucial aspect of the civil law/common law divide: diverging 
levels of tolerance for uncertainty. To him, the common law approach runs the risk of being 
“chaotic.” The civil law is profoundly adverse to uncertainty, which it sees as lawlessness in 
disguise.68      In  French  law  for  instance,  “la  sécurité  juridique”  or  “legal  security”—which 
designates at the same time the intelligibility, predictability and stability of the law—is regarded 
as an essential feature of the rule of law.69 The common law, on the other hand, tolerates a 
remarkably high level of uncertainty. Numerous questions are unsettled. Decided cases can 
remove the uncertainty, but they need to be numerous, published and readily accessible.  It is 
 
 
62 MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 50, at 34 (“…our legal tradition was originally created and has grown 
and developed in the hands of judges, reasoning closely from case to case and building a body of law that binds 
subsequent judges, through the doctrine of stare decisis, to decide similar cases similarly.”). 
 
63 MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 50, at 56 (“It is reasonable to speak of the common law as a law of 
the judges…”). 
 
64  Id. at 34 (citing the names of Coke, Mansfield, Marshall, Story, Holmes, Brandeis, Cardozo). 
 
65 Id. at 66 (“[c]ommon law judges are problem solvers rather than theoreticians”). 
 
66 OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). 
 
67 Tunc, supra note 59, at 468. The comparison between the law on the one hand, and the “exact sciences” and the 
“rules” that govern the world, on the other, is striking. Tunc seems to compare the law with the laws of physics. 
 
68 See MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 50, at 48 (“There is a great emphasis in the literature of the civil 
law tradition on the importance of certainty in the law.  Certainty is, of course, an objective in all legal systems, but 
in the civil law tradition it has come to be a kind of supreme value, an unquestioned dogma, a fundamental goal.”). 
 
69 See generally Conseil d’État, Sécurité juridique et complexité du droit,  ÉTUDES  ET  DOCUMENTS  DU  CONSEIL 
D’ÉTAT  1,  223  (2006),  http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/var/storage/rapports-publics/064000245.pdf. 
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expected that several decided cases will result in the possibility to enunciate a general 
principle.70 The whole system thus rests on a steady stream of decided cases. If the cases 
disappear, the system collapses. Although the common law tolerates more uncertainty than the 
civil law, it demands, like any system of law, a minimum level of certainty.71 Without cases, the 
common law presents too much uncertainty for anyone to bear. 
These contrasting traditional concepts of law, and their corresponding diverging tolerance for 
uncertainty, explain the contrast between, on the one hand, the anxiety of common lawyers about 
the success and confidentiality of arbitration, and on the other hand, the relative serenity of civil 
lawyers. 
For the common lawyer, arbitration endangers the common law because it takes cases away from 
the courts, and thus reduces the stream of cases that a minimum level of certainty requires. 
Confidentiality adds insult to injury. But even if arbitration awards were not confidential, the 
problem would remain. Judges, not arbitrators, build the edifice of the common law. For the 
civil lawyer, by contrast, the fact that courts decide less cases is not a cause for concern. Judges 
do not make law; they simply apply it. Certainty is not the result of a long accumulation of 
cases; it rests on the achievement of the Code’s original designers, and the subtle elaborations of 
its exegetes. All things being equal, publication of arbitration awards is desirable, because 
guidance is helpful (though not necessary). Confidentiality may be criticized; but the existence 
of arbitration itself is not a cause for concern. 
Now that we have a better understanding of how and why different legal traditions react 
differently to international arbitration, let us turn to how the dearth of precedent in industries 
prone to international arbitration has influenced the practice of international arbitration, with 
particular emphasis on legal reasoning. 
 
IV. HOW INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION PRACTITIONERS DEAL WITH THE 
DEARTH OF PRECEDENT 
 
International arbitration practitioners often have to deal with a dearth of precedent. This section 
discusses how, in our experience, they do it. Four techniques in particular come to mind: 
reference to academic treatises and other scholarly writings; a comparative approach; reliance on 
industry practice; and reasoning from abstract principles. 
A.   Reference to Academic Treatises and Other Scholarly Writings 
 
A first technique that is prevalent in international arbitration is reference to academic treatises 
and other scholarly writings.  Recourse to scholarly works is particularly prevalent in relation to 
 
 
 
 
70 The case book method in U.S. law schools illustrates this principle: one learns the law and its principles by 
reading cases. 
 
71  MERRYMAN & PÉREZ-PERDOMO, supra note 50, at 48 (“It is recognized [in the common law] that people should, 
to the extent possible, know the nature of their rights and obligations and be able to plan their actions with some 
confidence about the legal consequences; but it is also widely recognized that there are limits on the extent to which 
certainty is possible.”). 
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questions of arbitral procedure.72 But it is also common regarding the substantive merits of the 
dispute. 
In an international construction arbitration, for example, one would be remiss not to make 
reference to the seminal treatises on the FIDIC forms of contract: Nael Bunni, The FIDIC Forms 
of Contract (2005); I.N. Duncan Wallace, The International Civil Engineering Contract (1974, 
1980); E.C. Corbett, FIDIC 4th—A Practical Legual Guide (1991); and J. Glover & S. Hughes, 
Understanding the New FIDIC Red Book: A Clause by Clause Commentary (2006).73 
Similarly, in international arbitrations arising out of a Bermuda Form insurance contract, insurers 
and policyholders rely heavily on the two major scholarly commentaries on the Bermuda Form: 
Richard Jacobs QC, Lorelie S Masters, Paul Stanley, Liability Insurance in International 
Arbitration—The Bermuda Form (2d ed. 2011) and David Scorey, Richard Geddes, Chris Harris, 
The Bermuda Form—Interpretation and Dispute Resolution of Excess Liability Insurance 
(2011). The Jacobs treatise generally takes a pro-policyholder position, while the Scorey treatise 
tends to be pro-insurer. 
In oil and gas arbitration, reference is often made to, for instance, Howard R. Williams & 
Charles J. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law (2003 ed.). 
B. Comparative Approach 
 
A second feature of advocacy in international arbitration is the use of a comparative approach. 
Emmanuel Gaillard, a distinguished scholar and practitioner of international arbitration, explains 
that, because of the systematic lack of precedent directly on point in international arbitration, a 
sort of “instinctive” comparative law method is omnipresent: 
Of course, arbitration practitioners invoke decisions that support 
the argument they wish  to  convince the  arbitral tribunal of  in 
exactly the same way as arbitrators will refer to what other 
arbitrators have done before them whenever they have access to 
such arbitral precedents. Very often, this practice goes beyond the 
relevant applicable law of the dispute. It is almost second nature to 
invoke arbitral awards in support of one’s argument, without even 
giving a second thought to the applicable law of the award that one 
is invoking.74 
 
 
 
 
72 Some oft-cited works on international arbitration law and procedure are: KLAUS PETER BERGER, INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ARBITRATION (1993); BORN, supra note 6; EMMANUEL GAILLARD & JOHN SAVAGE, FOUCHARD 
GAILLARD GOLDMAN ON INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (1999); JEAN-FRANÇOIS POUDRET  & 
SÉBASTIEN BESSON, COMPARATIVE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION (Stephen Berti & Annette Ponti trans., 
2d ed. 2007); REDFERN ET AL., supra note 11. 
 
73 See Seppälä, supra note 23, at 72. 
 
74 Emmanuel Gaillard, Foreword, to PRECEDENT IN INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 1, 3 (Emmanuel Gaillard & Yas 
Banifatemi eds. 2008). 
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Christopher Seppälä tells the story of an ICC construction arbitration that illustrates the 
importance of the comparative approach in international arbitration.75 In that case, the governing 
law was “that of an Arab country with an undeveloped law.”76 The dispute related to a project to 
build a town. The employer had let the works out to three different contractors under three 
different main construction contracts (so-called “multi-prime” construction contracts). The 
question arose: what duty does an employer owe to its various prime contractors in the case of a 
multi-prime construction project where no provision is made for coordination of the performance 
of the work among the contractors by the employer? Unsurprisingly, the substantive applicable 
law did not address the issue. According to Chris: 
[W]e, as counsel to the contractor, undertook some research in 
comparative law and discovered that the law relating to the rights 
and duties of owners and contractors in multi-prime construction 
contract situations, though not much developed in Europe (e.g., in 
England or France), is highly developed in the United States. 
[…] 
The U.S. case law made clear that even where nothing is specified 
in the relevant construction contracts, where an owner has entered 
into multiple prime construction contracts whose performance can 
impact the performance of others, the owner has an implied 
affirmative duty to coordinate those contracts and to limit the risk 
that  performance  under  one  will  or  may  prevent  or  hinder 
performance under another.77 
Chris recounts next how the arbitral tribunal, composed of two Arab lawyers (including one from 
the country of the governing law) and one English Queen’s Counsel, “expressed relief at the 
hearing that concrete expression had been found” as to the concrete issue they faced.78 The 
tribunal even cited to passages from the relevant U.S. cases in its award. 
C. Reliance on Industry Practice 
 
A third common feature of advocacy in international arbitration is the reliance on industry 
practice and general principles recognized in the industry. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
75 Seppälä, supra note 23, at 74-77. 
 
76 Id. at 74. 
 
77 Id. at 76. 
 
78 Id. 
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In fact, one of the attractive features of arbitration is that, for disputes involving a technical or 
otherwise specialized field, the parties can appoint arbitrators with the relevant expertise or 
experience, who usually will be attuned and receptive to such arguments.79 
The term lex mercatoria – a term of art in the international arbitration world for decades – has 
given rise to much intellectual debate,80 which is not the purview of this brief article. It suffices 
to note that the term’s existence and continued appeal demonstrate that contemporary 
international arbitration practice shares with the “law merchant” of old81 a recognition that when 
deciding disputes in international trade, it is relevant to consider practices that are generally 
accepted in the relevant trade. One can also observe the development of bodies of principles 
accepted in a given industry, such as a “lex petrolea” in the oil and gas industry82 or a “lex 
sportiva” in sports cases.83 Finally, parties and arbitrators often rely on “trade usages” in arguing 
for their position and in justifying their decisions.84 
In particular, Article 28(4) of the UNCITRAL Model Law provides that “in all cases, the arbitral 
tribunal shall decide in accordance with the terms of the contract and shall take into account the 
usages of the trade applicable to the transaction.”85 Similarly, Article 35(3) of the 2010 
UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules provides that “[i]n all cases, the arbitral tribunal shall decide in 
accordance with the terms of the contract, if any, and shall take into account any usage of trade 
applicable to the transaction.”86  In the words of one commentator: 
Unlike some national laws that treat usages as secondary sources 
of law, international commercial law confers trade usages a more 
 
 
 
79 See, e.g., BORN, supra note 6, at 80–83 (discussing “[t]he parties’ desire for commercially-experienced decision- 
makers”); REDFERN ET AL., supra note 11, at 260 (“Part of the attraction of arbitration is the way in which the 
expertise necessary for the understanding and resolution of the dispute may be found amongst the arbitrators 
themselves.”). 
 
80 Compare Berthold Goldman, Frontières du droit et “lex mercatoria,” 9 ARCHIVES DE PHILOSOPHIE DU DROIT 177 
(1964), and Berthold Goldman, La Lex Mercatoria dans les Contrats et l’Arbitrage Internationaux: Réalité et 
Perspectives, 106 J. DU DROIT INT’L 475 (1979), with Michael J. Mustill, The New Lex Mercatoria: The First 
Twenty five Years, 4 ARB. INT’L 86 (1988). For a relatively recent restatement, see Emmanuel Gaillard, 
Transnational Law: A Legal System or a Method of Decision Making?, 17 ARB. INT’L 59 (2001). 
 
81 See BORN, supra note 6, at 30-35. 
 
82 Doak Bishop, International Arbitration of Petroleum Disputes: The Development of a Lex Petrolea, 23 ICCA 
Y.B. COM. ARB. 1131 (1998). 
 
83 ANTONIO RIGOZZI, L’ARBITRAGE INTERNATIONAL EN MATIERE DE SPORT 628 (2005). 
 
84 See generally BORN, supra note 6, at 2664–68. 
 
85 UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration, art. 28(4) (2006) (emphasis added); see BORN, 
supra note 6, at 2665 n.266 (listing arbitration laws with similar language). 
 
86 UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules, Art. 35(3) (as revised in 2010) (emphasis added); see BORN, supra note 6, at 2665 
n.270 (listing arbitration rules with similar language). 
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active role compared to those national legal systems. This active 
and significant role materializes in two different ways. Firstly, 
trade usages may be recognized as a part of the contract between 
the parties, where governing law permits such an application, 
under the “implied terms” doctrine that governs the common law 
jurisdictions. Secondly, international arbitration rules may provide 
that arbitrators shall, along with the national and/or a-national 
substantive rules applicable to the merits of the dispute, take into 
account the trade usages relevant with the transaction.87 
D. Reasoning from Abstract Principles 
 
Finally, international arbitration practitioners often make arguments based on abstract 
principles.88 A manifestation of this tendency is the reference to Latin maxims such as nemo 
auditur turpitudinem suam allegans – no one can use his own wrongdoing in his favor – or pacta 
sunt servanda – one must abide by one’s agreements. International arbitration practitioners often 
refer to these maxims without feeling the need to support them with another authority (such as a 
case endorsing them, for instance); the principles are intrinsically authoritative. 
 
V. COULD THE EXPERIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 
PRACTITIONERS BE OF USE TO THE COMMON LAW PRACTIONER? 
 
The techniques on which international arbitration practitioners rely when facing a dearth of 
precedent tend to stem from the civil law. Recourse to treatises and other scholarly writings, for 
instance, is a quintessential civil law technique. In the civil law, as explained above, the 
“doctrine” – a term that intriguingly for the common lawyer designates at the same time the 
community of respected scholars and the body of scholarship they produce89 – has a significant 
influence on the development of the law.90 And while the comparative approach is not unique to 
the civil law system, it has been conceptualized and studied more by civil lawyers.91  Reliance on 
 
 
87 Tolga Ayoǧlu, Application of Trade Usages in International Institutional Arbitration – Some Reflections, 30 ASA 
BULL. 539, 539 (2012). 
 
88 On  the  canonical  distinction  between  rules  and  principles,  see  RONALD  DWORKIN,  The  Model  of  Rules  I,  in 
TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 29 (1977). 
 
89 See generally PHILIPPE JESTAZ & CHRISTOPHE JAMIN, LA DOCTRINE (2004). 
 
90 While in the common law, the authority figures (and the law makers) are the judges, in the civil law, they are the 
professors. See supra at III.B. 
 
91 See Konrad Zweigert & Hein Kötz, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMPARATIVE LAW (3d ed. 1998). The authors of this 
reference work are German scholars. According to them: “Comparative Law as we know it started in Paris in 1900, 
the year of the World Exhibition. At this brilliant panorama of human achievement there were naturally 
innumerable congresses, and the great French scholars Edouard Lambert and Raymond Saleilles took the 
opportunity to found an International Congress for Comparative Law.” Id. at 2. See also id. at 51–62 (describing the 
heavy German and French influence on the discipline); id. at 56 (discussing the very practical emphasis of early 
English comparative law scholarship, aimed at assisting the Privy Council, as the highest court of the Empire, in 
applying foreign law, and English tradesmen in knowing the commercial law of other peoples). 
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abstract principles is another hallmark of civil law reasoning which, as explained above,92 is 
quintessentially deductive.93 
Might the experience of international arbitration practitioners nonetheless be of use to the 
common law practitioner facing a dearth of precedent? The question might seem strange, even 
shocking; but upon closer examination it is not revolutionary.   In fact, we observe that U.S. 
advocates and judges, at the margin, when facing “issues of first impression”—by definition 
issues on which no precedent is available—deploy the very same techniques.94 
This is well illustrated by two recent New York cases, one federal and one state, relating to New 
York’s moratorium on high-volume hydraulic fracturing. In Wiser v. Enervest Operating L.L.C., 
the Northern District of New York found that the occurrence of the New York state moratorium 
during the primary term of oil and gas leases but prior to commencement of drilling did not end 
the requirement to make delay rental payments, and held that the lessees’ failure to make the 
required payments resulted in automatic termination of the leases.95   In Beardslee v. Inflection 
Energy LLC, the New York Court of Appeals, answering a certified question from the Second 
Circuit, held that the force majeure clause in oil and gas leases did not modify the habendum 
clause in  the leases and therefore did  not  extend their primary  terms.96     In  making these 
decisions, the courts used a comparative approach and relied on academic works and the industry 
practice – three of the four techniques on which international arbitration practitioners rely. 
As to the comparative approach, for example, the Wiser court stated: 
There is a dearth of authority in New York relating to oil and gas 
leases such as those now at issue. Both sides to this litigation have 
therefore identified cases from other jurisdictions where the law 
concerning  such  leases  is  far  more  developed,  though  not 
necessarily uniform, and have asked that the court draw upon the 
principles emanating from those cases.97 
The court proceeded to cite abundantly to decisions from other U.S. jurisdictions and discussed 
several of them.98    Similarly, in Beardslee, in reaching its conclusion that the force majeure 
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93 This is perhaps most obvious in the use of Latin maxims. Civil lawyers use such maxims without any additional 
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95 Wiser v. Enervest Operating L.L.C., 803 F. Supp. 2d 109, 112 (N.D.N.Y. 2011). 
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clause did not extend the primary terms of the leases, the New York Court of Appeals noted that 
its holding was “consistent with out-of-state ‘oil’ jurisdictions.”99 It cited and discussed cases 
decided by its “sister courts,”100 notably Texas and California courts. 
Both courts also relied on scholarly works. The Wiser court referred to numerous oil and gas 
treatises: Howard R. Williams & Charles J. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law (2003 ed.); W.L. 
Summers, The Law of Oil and Gas (Perm. ed. 1959); Nancy Saint–Paul, Summers Oil & Gas (3d 
ed.); and Eugene O. Kuntz, Oil and Gas (1967). The Beardslee Court also referred to two of 
these,101 to support its assertion that “an agreement for the production of oil and gas must be 
construed with reference to both the intention of the parties and the known practices within the 
industry.”102 
As can be seen from this last quote, in Beardslee, the New York Court of Appeals relied on 
generally recognized industry practices. The Wiser Court also relied on industry practice. The 
Court stated that “an understanding of the development of the industry is critical when 
construing the terms of an oil and gas lease.”103   It proceeded to present a detailed discussion of 
the “historical context” of delay rental provisions in oil and gas leases, relying on decisions from 
other jurisdictions and on scholarly works.104 It stated that its conclusion that  the  leases 
terminate automatically in the event that the lessor fails to commence drilling of a well or to pay 
delay rentals timely within the primary term of the leases was supported by “the clear and 
unequivocal terms of the leases in issue, as universally understood in the oil and gas 
industry.”105 
And while the Wiser and Beardslee courts did not rely on abstract principles of law, other U.S. 
courts have done so when facing issues of first impression. A locus classicus of legal theory in 
the United States—Riggs v. Palmer106—illustrates this well.  Elmer murdered his grandfather to 
prevent him from changing certain provisions in his will that were favorable to Elmer. The 
question was whether Elmer could inherit from his grandfather. Nothing in the relevant statutes 
prohibited it. The majority of the court nonetheless held that Elmer could not inherit. In 
reaching this conclusion, the court stated: 
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LAW (2003).  See 31 N.E.3d at 84. 
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[A]ll laws, as well as all contracts, may be controlled in their 
operation and effect by general, fundamental maxims of the 
common law. No one shall be permitted to profit by his own 
fraud, or to take advantage of his own wrong, or to found any 
claim upon his own iniquity, or to acquire property by his own 
crime.   These maxims are dictated by public policy, have their 
foundation in universal law administered in all civilized countries, 
and have nowhere been superseded by statutes.107 
In sum, in those rare cases when they are faced with issues of first impression, U.S. courts and 
advocates resort to the same techniques that international arbitration practitioners, who are often 
faced with such issues, routinely employ. 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
 
The dearth of precedent that international arbitration sometimes causes has generated anxiety in 
some common law quarters. But what brings the harm might also bring the cure: common law 
practitioners may find inspiration in the techniques used by international arbitration practitioners 
who are often faced with a lack of precedent. While these techniques are more typical of the 
civil lawyer’s toolkit, U.S. litigators and judges do at times employ them, but only at the 
margins, when dealing with issues of first impression. Experience in international arbitration 
indicates that in the areas of dearth, for instance in those cases in international commerce that 
still reach the common law courts, common lawyers may be forced to expand their toolkit and 
the margin may need to become the center. 
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